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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Neurotron, Inc. ("Neurotron") is a Maryland corporation 
which manufactures an electrodiagnostic medical testing 
device known as the Neurometer CPT ("Neur ometer"). 
Highmark, Inc. ("Highmark")1 is a Pennsylvania corporation 
engaged in the operation of nonprofit health care plans. 
Neurotron alleges that a passage in Highmark's newsletter, 
Policy Review and News ("PRN"), commer cially disparaged 
the Neurometer. Highmark successfully moved for summary 
judgment. Neurotron appeals. We will affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the time of the disputed events, Medical Services Association of 
Pennsylvania operated under the trade name "Pennsylvania Blue Shield." 
"Highmark, Inc." is the Pennsylvania corporation formed in 1996 by the 
consolidation of the former Pennsylvania Blue Shield and Blue Cross of 
Western Pennsylvania. The parties have stipulated that Highmark is the 
successor-in-interest to all of its pr edecessor corporations' rights and 
obligations. 
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I. 
 
The Neurometer tests a patient's ability to per ceive small 
electrical currents through a procedure known as "current 
perception threshold" testing ("CPT"). CPT involves 
connecting electrodes to the surface of the patient's skin 
and then delivering a series of low-voltage electrical shocks 
and recording whether the shocks wer e perceived. Through 
a series of shocks at decreasing voltages, the Neurometer 
establishes the lowest level of current that the patient is 
able to feel. It then compares these readings to a database 
of "normal" readings and delivers a printout that states 
whether the patient's sensory perception of electrical 
current is either elevated ("hyperesthesia"), normal, or 
depressed ("hypoesthesia"). Hyper esthesia and hypoesthesia 
can be symptoms of numerous medical problems. 
Neurotron contends that the Neurometer is a useful 
diagnostic tool because it can detect these symptoms at a 
very early stage. 
 
Highmark provides nonprofit health insurance programs 
which cover the medical expenses of Highmark members. 
Among the services that Highmark excludes fr om payment 
are services that are experimental or investigational. Its 
agreement with its members and health car e providers 
stipulates that Highmark "does not cover services which it 
determines are Experimental or Investigative in nature 
because those services are not accepted by the broad 
medical community as effective treatments." App. III at 
298a. That agreement defines "Experimental or 
Investigative" as follows: 
 
       the use of any . . . procedure . . . which[Highmark], 
       relying on the advice of the general medical community 
       which includes but is not limited to medical 
       consultants, medical journals and/or gover nmental 
       regulations, does not accept as standar d medical 
       treatment of the condition being treated, or any such 
       items requiring federal or other governmental agency 
       approval for which approval has not been granted at 
       the time the services were rendered. 
 
App. III at 300a. 
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Highmark's Medical Policy Department ("MPD") r eviews 
developments in health care practice and pr ocedure and 
makes determinations as to when a new pr oduct or 
procedure has advanced beyond the experimental or 
investigational stage and becomes an accepted part of 
standard medical practice. Highmark's Benefits Utilization 
Management Department ("BUMD") conducts post-payment 
audits of health care providers to assur e that their billings 
to Highmark have been in accordance with the applicable 
policies and regulations, that services ar e reported and paid 
accurately, and that unnecessary services ar e not being 
prescribed. 
 
In October of 1990, Ralph Cohen, Neurotr on's President, 
wrote to Highmark requesting that the Neur ometer be 
reviewed and evaluated for coverage. Highmark r eferred the 
request to the MPD which, pursuant to Highmark's policy, 
initiated a "consultant review." Thr ee independent 
neurologists, Drs. Brennan, Jeffries, and Lossing, evaluated 
the Neurometer and CPT. Based upon the consultant 
review, Highmark concluded that CPT was investigational 
in nature and was, therefore, an uncovered service. 
 
In October of 1991, Dr. Jefferson Katims, Neurotron's 
Director of Research, wrote to Highmark to request again 
that the Neurometer be reviewed and evaluated for 
coverage. Dr. Joseph Ricci, Highmark's V ice President for 
Medical Affairs, responded in November of 1991 that 
Highmark's opinion remained unchanged and that, 
consequently, CPT would remain noncover ed. 
 
In 1994, Dr. Katims again wrote to Dr . Ricci to request 
reevaluation of CPT. Dr. Ricci r eferred the request to the 
MPD for review by Douglas Worley. W orley solicited advice 
from Drs. Lossing, Samuels, and Silverman. Based upon 
the advice of these independent consultants, Highmark 
concluded that CPT continued to be investigational. 
Highmark added CPT to Medical Policy Bulletin Z-24 which 
listed numerous products and procedur es which were not 
covered because they had been determined to be 
investigational. 
 
In 1996, Emelie Sconing, Manager of the BUMD, 
conducted a claims review of certain chir opractors who 
 
                                4 
  
appeared to be inappropriately billing noncovered CPT as 
covered nerve conduction velocity tests. She sent the claims 
files of the providers under investigation to consultants for 
review. The consultants, Drs. Tar ola and Samuels, 
concluded that the providers under investigation had 
actually performed CPT and not nerve conduction velocity 
tests. Dr. Tarola opined that"CPT is a nonspecific 
electrodiagnostic procedure that lacks proof of validity and 
reliability, and has limited clinical utility." App. III at 223a. 
He concluded that "the CPT's perfor med on the above 
referenced patients were medically unnecessary because of 
apparent indiscriminate use of the procedure and its lack 
of validity, reliability, and clinical utility." Id. at 224a. Dr. 
Samuels opined that a "CPT test is experimental and of no 
proven clinical value. It is not a nerve conduction test. All 
of these claims should be denied." Id. at 225a. 
 
Having concluded that health care providers were 
submitting claims for covered nerve conduction velocity 
tests when in fact they were perfor ming noncovered CPT, 
Sconing asked the MPD to prepare a notice for publication 
in Highmark's newsletter, PRN, that CPT tests were not 
permissibly billed as nerve conduction velocity tests. 
Highmark uses the PRN to communicate medical policies 
and other information to its participating health care 
providers. 
 
Worley drafted the requested notice by adopting the 
language of Dr. Samuels' comments assessing CPT testing. 
The notice appeared in the February, 1997, edition of the 
PRN and read, in its entirety, as follows: 
 
       Neuro-selective current per ception threshold test 
 
       The neuro-selective current perception threshold test is 
       performed to provide an objective measure of subjective 
       sensation. It requires the patient's conscious 
       perception of the stimulation applied. The neur o- 
       selective current perception threshold test has no 
       proven clinical utility and is not eligible for payment, 
       since it is considered to be investigational. 
 
       Use procedure code 95999 to report this service. 
 
The District Court found that although the passage did 
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not refer specifically to Neurotr on or the Neurometer, there 
was sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find 
that the passage could be understood as referring to the 
Neurometer. The District Court also found that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the PRN article 
was false. Summary judgment was granted, however , for 
three reasons, each of which precluded a recovery for 
Neurotron: (1) the PRN's statement that CPT had "no 
proven clinical utility" was not disparaging; (2) Highmark 
was conditionally privileged to publish the PRN, and 
Highmark had not abused its privilege; and (3) the r ecord 
would not support a finding "that Defendants either knew 
their statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of 
its falsity . . . ."2 
 
II. 
 
We agree with the District Court that while the summary 
judgment record may perhaps r eflect a material dispute of 
fact as to whether the challenged statement was the result 
of negligence on the part of Highmark, it will not support a 
finding that this statement was believed by Highmark to be 
false or made by it with reckless indif ference as to its truth 
or falsity. We also agree with the District Court that 
Neurotron, as a matter of law, cannot r ecover in the 
absence of such a finding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of summary 
judgment and review the facts in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was entered. See Coolspring Stone 
Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 
1993). Summary judgment is proper if ther e is no genuine issue of 
material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986). At the summary judgment stage, the court's function is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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A. The Challenged Statement 
 
We begin our analysis by focusing on the challenged 
statement. Its purpose was to communicate to participating 
health care providers that payments for CPT would not be 
reimbursed by Highmark. Understandably, the statement 
also communicated Highmark's explanation for its no 
coverage position: in Highmark's opinion, CPT was 
investigational in the sense that its clinical value had not 
been proven. While this explanation does not directly state 
to whom the clinical value of CPT has not been pr oven, the 
only reasonable inference to be drawn is the medical 
community. As Highmark stresses, its explanation cannot 
reasonably be understood as an affirmative assertion that 
CPT had been established to be without value in the 
practice of medicine. 
 
B. The Governing Law 
 
We agree with the parties that Pennsylvania law governs 
the liability issues in this diversity action. Accor dingly, we 
are required to predict the law that would be applied by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to the facts of this case. 
See Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F .2d 1366, 1369 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not decided a 
"trade libel" or "injurious falsehood" case in over 25 years. 
So far as we have been able to determine, it has never 
expressed a view on the dispositive issue her e -- whether 
the absence of a reasonable basis for a disparaging 
statement will alone support a recovery in a case of this 
kind. 
 
When we find ourselves without guidance fr om the 
highest court of the state whose law applies, we look to the 
decisional law of the state's intermediate appellate courts, 
to the decisions of other federal courts interpr eting that 
state's law, and to decisions from other jurisdictions 
discussing the relevant issue. Boyanowski v. Capital Area 
Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 2000). In 
particular, "[a]n intermediate appellate state court's 
decision `is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not 
to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced 
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by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state 
would decide otherwise.' " Id. (quoting from West v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). 
 
The Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court of 
Pennsylvania, recently discussed the Pennsylvania law 
governing "trade libel" or "injurious falsehood" claims in Pro 
Golf Manufacturing, Inc. v. Tribune Review Newspaper 
Company, 761 A.2d 553 (2000). The specific issue involved 
there was whether the claim alleged was a defamation claim 
governed by a one-year statute of limitations or a libel 
claim governed by a two-year statute. After noting that the 
latter tort was variously referred to as"trade libel," 
"commercial disparagement," and "injurious falsehood," the 
Court looked to S 623A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
and described the tort as follows: 
 
       Regardless of the label, the publication of a disparaging 
       statement concerning the business of another is 
       actionable where: (1) the statement is false; (2) the 
       publisher either intends the publication to cause 
       pecuniary loss or reasonably should recognize that 
       publication will result in pecuniary loss; (3) pecuniary 
       loss does in fact result; and (4) the publisher either 
       knows that the statement is false or acts in r eckless 
       disregard of its truth or falsity. Restatement (Second) of 
       Torts S 623(A) (1977). 
 
Pro Golf, 761 A.2d at 555-56. 
 
Like the Superior Court in Pro Golf, federal district courts 
sitting in Pennsylvania have predicted that the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania would look to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to determine the parameters of the tort of 
injurious falsehood. See Swift Bros. v. Swift & Sons, Inc., 
921 F. Supp. 267, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. 
Amber Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 863 (E.D. Pa. 
1985) Zerpol Corp. v. DMD Corp., 561 F . Supp. 404 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983). 
 
We have been referred to nothing which suggests to us 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would take any other 
approach to defining the tort of injurious falsehood than 
that followed by Pro Golf. Mor eover, even if we did not have 
the benefit of Pro Golf, we would r each the same conclusion 
 
                                8 
  
based on the respect the Pennsylvania Supr eme Court has 
consistently accorded the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
even in situations in which Pennsylvania common law 
precedents varied from the Restatement  rule. See Gilbert v. 
Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 100 n.25 (Pa. 1974) ("In recent 
years, this Court has not hesitated to adopt sections of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) when our common-law 
precedents varied from the Restatement  or when the 
Pennsylvania common law provided no answer ."); Walker v. 
Grand Central Sanitation, Inc., 634 A.2d 237, 244 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993) ("We are convinced, and therefore hold, 
that Section 621 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
accurately states the law of Pennsylvania with r egard to 
damages in cases of slander per se. . . . This is consistent 
with our Supreme Court's tendency to adopt the Second 
Restatement of Torts in defamation matters."); Agriss v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984) (noting "Pennsylvania's general tendency to follow the 
Restatement rule in defamation law."); Medico v. Time, Inc., 
643 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Pennsylvania follows the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts on most matters . . . . We 
believe it appropriate to accept as the law of Pennsylvania 
the version of the fair report privilege embodied in the 
current Restatement."). 
 
Based on the foregoing, we predict that the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania would apply Sections 623A and 626 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to this case. Those 
sections provide: 
 
        S 623A. Liability for Publication of Injurious 
       Falsehood -- General Principle 
 
       One who publishes a false statement harmful to the 
       interests of another is subject to liability for 
       pecuniary loss resulting to the other if 
 
        (a) he intends for publication of the statemen t to 
       result in harm to interests of the other having a 
       pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
       recognize that it is likely to do so, and 
 
        (b) he knows that the statement is false or ac ts in 
       reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 
 
                                9 
  
       S 626. Disparagement of Quality -- T rade Libel 
 
       The rules on liability for the publication of an 
       injurious falsehood stated in S 623A apply to the 
       publication of matter disparaging the quality of 
       another's land, chattels or intangible things, that 
       the publisher should recognize as likely to r esult in 
       pecuniary loss to the other through the conduct of 
       a third person in respect to the other's interests in 
       the property. 
 
Before turning to the task of applying these principles to 
the record in this case, we note that the"General Principle" 
set forth in S 623A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is 
subject to the following two "caveats:" 
 
       Caveats: 
 
        The Institute takes no position on the questions of: 
 
        (1) Whether, instead of showing the pub lisher's 
       knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of the 
       statement, as indicated in Clause (b), the other may 
       recover by showing that the publisher had either 
 
        (a) a motive of ill will toward him, or 
 
        (b) an intent to interfere in an un privileged manner 
       with his interests; or 
 
        (2) Whether either of these alternate ba ses, if not 
       alone sufficient, would be made sufficient by being 
       combined with a showing of negligence regar ding the 
       truth or falsity of the statement. 
 
The commentary to S 623A explains that these caveats 
are necessary because of recent jurisprudence of the United 
States Supreme Court tailoring the common law of 
defamation to the demands of the First Amendment and 
because of uncertainty concerning the extent to which this 
jurisprudence may also apply to "injurious falsehood." In 
this context, Comment (d) to S 623A describes the state of 
the preexisting common law as follows: 
 
       In addition to the knowledge-or-reckless-disregard 
       basis for liability set out in Clause (b), the common law 
       recognized two others as alternatives. At common law, 
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       the publisher of an injurious falsehood was also held 
       subject to liability, (1) if he was motivated by ill will 
       toward the other (malice, in the factual sense), or (2) if 
       he intended to interfere with the inter ests of the other 
       in an unprivileged manner (intent to harm). Knowledge 
       or reckless disregard as to falsity has not been a 
       requirement for these other two bases of liability at 
       common law. 
 
These caveats are not applicable here. Nothing in the 
record suggests that Highmark was motivated by ill will 
towards Neurotron or that its purpose was to harm 
Neurotron's business in an unprivileged manner. There is 
no evidence that would support an inference that 
Highmark's purpose was anything other than to 
communicate its position on CPT to its participating health 
care providers, a purpose that is clearly a privileged one. 
 
The discussion of these caveats in the Restatement 
commentary is helpful here, however, because it goes on to 
document that in the absence of actual ill will towards the 
plaintiff or an intent to injure for an unprivileged purpose, 
negligence regarding the falsity of the disparaging 
statement was not a sufficient basis for imposing liability at 
common law. See Restatement (Second) of T orts S 623A cmt. 
d ("In an action for injurious falsehood, negligence 
[regarding falsity] has not been a sufficient basis at 
common law to impose liability."). 
 
In concluding that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
would look to the Restatement (Second) of T orts for the law 
governing this case, we have not been unmindful of that 
Court's decision in Menefee v. Columbia Br oadcasting 
System, Inc., 329 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1974). Menefee, the 
plaintiff, alleged that he had been a successful radio 
personality. His employer terminated his employment and 
allegedly told the press that he was "incompetent in the 
performance of his assigned broadcast duties." Menefee 
died after filing suit. Under Pennsylvania law, libel and 
slander causes of action abate at death but other tort 
claims survive. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
Menefee had a cause of action for "untruthful 
disparagement" of his interest in his br oadcast career 
which was governed by the two-year statute. It relied upon 
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SS 624 and 633 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, the then 
current Restatement, in the course of establishing that the 
alleged injury to Menefee's broadcast car eer gave rise to a 
tort distinct from the defamation claim arising from the 
injury to his personal reputation. The case pr esented no 
issue with respect to whether liability could be predicated 
on a negligent misrepresentation r egarding Menefee's 
professional competence. 
 
Neurotron finds Menefee important because S 624 of the 
Restatement (First) of Torts describes the general rule 
governing liability for "trade libel" without requiring that the 
defendant must either have known his statement to be false 
or have made it with reckless indiffer ence as to its truth or 
falsity. While Neurotron correctly characterizes the position 
taken by the Restatement at the time Menefee was decided, 
that decision does not persuade us that the pr ediction 
found in Pro Golf is in error . We believe the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, if presented with this case, would accept 
the Restatement (Second) as the most r eliable collation of 
the common law of injurious falsehood. As we have noted, 
that Court has not hesitated to follow the curr ent 
Restatement of Torts even when it is in tension with 
Pennsylvania's own prior jurisprudence. Menefee  did not 
involve the determinative issue here, and we have found no 
other Pennsylvania precedent inconsistent withS 623A's 
requirement of actual knowledge of falsity or reckless 
indifference. The inclusion of that r equirement was the 
product of a careful reevaluation of the common law 
precedents by the American Law Institute.3 If called upon to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The first Restatement, based in part on an influential law review 
article published in 1913, adopted the view that where no privilege 
existed, the case law called for strict liability for false disparagement 
without regard to innocence, good intentions or honest belief. Based 
primarily on a review of the case law by Dean Prosser in Injurious 
Falsehood: The Basis of Liability, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 425 (1959), which 
found the common law more analogous to fraud and interference with 
contract rather than defamation, the Restatement (Second) reflects the 
view that there is liability when (1) "the defendant knowingly or 
recklessly speaks a falsehood," (2) "acts from a spite motive," or (3) 
"out 
of a desire to do harm for its own sake." See Prosser and Keeton On the 
Law of Torts S 128 (5th ed. 1984). 
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decide this dispositive legal issue for the first time, we are 
confident that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
accept the consensus reached as a result of this 
reevaluation. Finally, we find it significant that the Pro Golf, 
Zerpol, and Swift Brothers opinions bear evidence that each 
of these courts had focused on Menefee in the course of 
concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts .4 
 
It necessarily follows that summary judgment was 
properly entered in favor of Highmark unless the record 
would support a finding that Highmark acted with actual 
knowledge of the falsity of its PRN statement or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. 
 
C. The Record 
 
We start by asking whether the summary judgment 
record would support a finding that those at Highmark 
responsible for the PRN article knew or believed that the 
clinical value of CPT had been proven to the medical 
community. It will not. The internal Highmark 
documentation indicates that it believed the clinical value 
had not been generally accepted in the medical community, 
and we find no evidence to the contrary.5 Moreover, notably 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We conclude that Neurotron's reliance on our decision in U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d 
Cir. 1990) is also misplaced. In U.S. Healthcare, the parties had engaged 
in a heated advertising war, ultimately suing each other for various 
reasons including alleged commercial disparagement. The District Court 
granted the defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) on the gr ounds that the defendants' 
advertisements were protected by the actual malice standard of the First 
Amendment as articulated by New York T imes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), and that the plaintiff had not met the applicable clear and 
convincing standard of proof requirement. U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 
920. This Court reversed, holding that the New York Times actual malice 
requirement did not apply to purely commercial speech. The portion of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts that we find dispositive here is based 
upon common law uninfluenced by New York Times and its progeny. 
 
5. The record does contain a March 27, 1995, letter from Dr. Sotoudish 
to Diana Perota of Highmark's Medical Policy Department in response to 
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absent from the record is any evidence of a reason why 
Highmark would represent that the clinical value had not 
been established in the medical community when it knew 
or believed to the contrary. While Neurotr on speculates in 
its brief about possible economic motives for Highmark's 
wanting to suppress use of CPT even though it is less 
expensive than the generally accepted nerve conduction 
studies,6 no hint of such motivation is found in Highmark's 
internal documentation, and there is no expert analysis 
supporting any of those suggested motives. 
 
This leaves the question of whether Highmark's PRN 
statement was made with reckless indiffer ence as to 
whether the clinical value of CPT had been pr oven to the 
medical community. Here also we conclude that the 
summary judgment record would not support a finding in 
Neurotron's favor. 
 
The record reflects that Highmark had a department 
whose function it was to ascertain whether a tr eatment at 
any given time was investigative as that ter m is defined in 
its contracts. Moreover, that department had established 
guidelines for making such determination. The record 
suggests nothing unreasonable about these institutional 
arrangements. 
 
In 1990 and again in 1994, Highmark, utilizing this 
previously established apparatus, undertook to determine 
the current status of CPT in the medical community. In 
each instance it engaged the services of thr ee qualified 
medical experts as consultants. Nothing in the r ecord 
suggests any deficiency in the process by which these 
consultants were selected. The recor d does reflect that 
Neurotron, in 1994, asked that certain physicians not be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
an inquiry about nerve conduction studies, a dif ferent form of testing, 
and their use in the context of diabetic neur opathy. On page three of 
that four page letter, there is a single mention of CPT as an alternative 
to nerve conduction studies in diabetic neur opathy. This isolated 
reference in a letter on another subject will not support an inference 
that 
those responsible for the PRN believed that their statement was false. 
 
6. Dr. Katims in his correspondence with Highmark emphasizes the cost 
effectiveness of using CPT. 
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chosen because they were viewed by Neur otron as having a 
conflict of interest and that none of the physicians named 
was chosen. On both occasions, Highmark provided its 
chosen experts with the relevant information it had 
accumulated on the subject of inquiry including the 
materials that it had been supplied by Neurotr on. In 1990 
that information consisted of Neurotr on literature 
describing the Neurometer, and a jour nal article with 
references to other materials on CPT and the Neurometer. 
In 1994, that information consisted of Neur otron literature 
describing the Neurometer, a bibliography of literature on 
CPT, and a list of medical institutions then currently using 
the Neurometer. In both 1990 and 1994, each of the three 
experts responded that CPT was not accepted in the 
medical community as having value in the diagnosis and 
treatment of patients. 
 
While no full evaluation of CPT was conducted in 1996, 
an investigation of suspected misbillings for nerve 
conduction velocity studies in that year produced letters 
from two expert consultants tending to confir m the results 
of the six independent evaluations conducted earlier . Most 
importantly, in addition to this uniform pr ofessional 
opinion, as of February, 1997, when the PRN was 
published, not a single participating physician had asked 
Highmark to make CPT a covered service or had 
complained about a failure to reimburse a payment for 
CPT. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the r ecord 
establishes a rational basis for Highmark's PRN statement. 
This is not to say that Neurotron has been unable to come 
forward with a number of legitimate criticisms of that 
statement and of the process by which it came to be made. 
However, those criticisms, individually or in combination, 
do not permit a reasonable inference that Highmark made 
its PRN statement with reckless indiffer ence as to its truth. 
 
Neurotron has tendered expert testimony tending to show 
that there were doctors using CPT prior to 1997 who 
believed it to be useful in their practice. It has also 
produced literature that reports on such use by medical 
professionals. This evidence does not, however , demonstrate 
that Highmark proceeded with reckless indifference. As we 
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have noted, because the PRN statement did not state to 
whom the utility of CPT had not been proven, the only 
reasonable inference is the medical community. That 
concept necessarily posits situations in which ther e will 
have been some use, but use short of community 
acceptance. Highmark's independent consultants wer e 
clearly aware that CPT was being used by health care 
professionals and appeared in the medical literature. 
Nevertheless, they unanimously opined that the CPT's 
clinical utility had not been accepted in the medical 
community. 
 
Neurotron believes that Highmark's consultants did 
superficial studies of the peer reviewed literature and would 
have reached a different result had they conducted 
reasonably careful studies. It faults Highmark for not doing 
"due diligence" reviews to assure the quality of the 
consultants' performance and points to an instance in 
which a consultant informed Highmark that he had not 
read all of the articles in Neurotr on's bibliography. Those at 
Highmark familiar with its use of consultants testified that 
Highmark selected its consultants with care, called upon 
them to do whatever they believed necessary to have an 
informed opinion, and trusted in their pr ofessional 
judgment. One can perhaps debate the merits of 
Highmark's approach in this area, but one cannot, we 
believe, accurately classify it as reckless indifference to the 
truth.7 
 
Neurotron also insists that Highmark intentionally 
prejudiced its consultants' studies by indicating the 
outcome it desired in its letters of engagement and by 
suggesting standards other than clinical utility for its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Contrary to Neurotron's suggestion, we find no probative value in what 
it characterizes as an "admission" of counsel that Highmark "had not 
conducted proper reviews." Appellant's Br. p. 17. After Highmark had 
been sued by Neurotron, counsel was quoted as speculating in a letter 
that "they are probably in the tr ouble (sic) they are in because they 
said 
the machine had no clinical utility and did not have their experts review 
the material that Katims offered to pr ovide them." App. II at 86a. We 
view this as hindsight speculation about why Highmark is in litigation 
and not a confession concerning liability for reckless indifference or 
even 
negligence. 
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consultants to apply. However, the evidence indicates no 
more than that (1) Highmark described its existing no 
coverage position in the course of explaining the r eason for 
the inquiry and (2) Highmark asked whether CPT had 
clinical utility beyond the presently used testing in addition 
to its inquiry about whether CPT's clinical utility had been 
established. We conclude that a reasonable factfinder could 
not draw the inference from this evidence that Neurotron 
suggests. 
 
Finally, Neurotron urges that one of Highmark's 
consultants during the 1994 evaluation advised it that CPT 
was "safe and effective." App. III at 172a. The inference it 
suggests is that Highmark knew its PRN statement 
regarding a lack of proven utility was false or at least was 
recklessly indifferent to whether CPT was efficacious. In 
context, its is clear that Dr. Silver man was acknowledging 
that CPT was safe and measured what it purported to 
measure. The letter is not inconsistent with Dr . Silverman's 
overall view that CPT's utility had not been demonstrated to 
the medical community.8 
 
III. 
 
Finding no material dispute of fact as to an essential 
element of Neurotron's case, we will affirm the summary 
judgment entered by the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Prior to the "safe and effective" statement, Dr. Silverman's letter 
states 
that "this test is not used by neurologists or plastic surgeons secondary 
to its poor reliability and subjective natur e." The letter concludes, 
"Overall, this procedure is not in the mainstream and is not used by 
mainstream physicians in our area." App. III at 172a. 
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